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I. Objectives of Presentation
As countries attain democracy, their territorial borders and internal
productivity systems open up to the functionalities of globalization, 
characterized by, among other things, trade and investment activities across 
national frontiers.  In Kenya, improvements in democratic governance have 
attracted a wide array of land-based activities by both local private investors 
and those from virtually every country in the world, meaning that the 
country is now a viable destination for private investment.  So significant is 
private investment to the country’s development that its government has 
established a distinct institution, dubbed KenInvest, tasked with the 
responsibility of attracting private investments from around the world.1 
The need for development activities to spur the country’s economic 
growth has created many investment opportunities that are deemed 
attractive by foreign and local investors.  The result is that there are 
currently a large number of foreign and local investors undertaking a variety 
of land-based investment activities.  Such projects include the 
establishment of tourist hotels by British, Italian, German, and investors of 
* University of Nairobi, School of Law and National Environment Tribunal;
Nairobi, Kenya. 
1. KenIvest, INVESTINKENYA.COM, http://www.investmentkenya.com/about-ken
invest (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
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other nationalities (especially along the coast of Kenya);2 large-scale 
cultivation of cash crops, including fruits by Del Monte;3 and biofuel crops 
by foreign investment companies.4  Among others, Chinese investors are 
constructing roads and residential apartments,5 and a British investor’s 
mobile telephone baking service is now deemed to be one of the most 
lucrative investments worldwide, generating billions of shillings in revenue 
every month.6  Investments in all the aforementioned areas require 
possession of a valid interest in land, whether freehold or leasehold.7  Even 
operation of telephone banking services requires access to land, given that 
construction of telephone masts requires acquisition of a valid interest in 
land. 
On the backdrop of the prevailing position summarized above, this 
paper seeks to increase actual and potential investor knowledge about (i) 
the existing government’s restrictive regulations of private land use, and (ii) 
emerging developments in the nature of land ownership and related claims 
2. For example, in Watamu Marine Stakeholders Ass’n & Another v. Nat’l Env’t
Auth. & Blazer Watamu Ltd. (2007) N.E.T. 07 (Kenya), Blazer Watamu Ltd., a company 
owned by Italians was in the process of constructing villas on a peninsula at the 
coast of Kenya.  The Authority stopped the activity because of the ecological 
sensitivity of the peninsular. 
3. See, DELMONTE KENYA LTD., Company Profile, http://www.manta.com (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
4. Such companies include Bedford Biofuels Ltd., which, in Nature Kenya v.
Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. (NEMA) and Bedford Biofuels Ltd., (2011) N.E.T. 79 (Kenya), 
sought to defend its decision to cultivate jatropha caucus on more than 219,000 acres 
of land in Tana Delta, Kenya. 
5. See, for example, China Signs Contract to Boost Kenya’s Road Network, STANDARD 
DIGITAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000026600& 
story_title=China-signs-contract-to-boost-Kenya%E2%80%99s-road-network, which 
confirms that Chinese companies are undertaking road construction on most of 
Kenya’s highways and that China Roads and Bridges Corporation, one of the 
companies involved in the works, has been in Kenya for over twenty six years.  It is a 
fact that increasingly, the companies are also engaging in housing constructions 
works. 
6. The Company is known as Safaricom.  See, SAFARICOM, www. 
safaricom.co.ke (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
7. All investments involving land-based activities require ownership of an
interest in land and for that purpose, KenInvest is tasked with, among other things, 
“facilitation and management of investment sites, estates or land together with 
associated facilities on the sites, estates and land” (§ 15(2)(d)).  The Ministry of 
Lands is one of the ministries represented in the Kenya Investment Authority (§ 
16(2)(d) of the Investment Promotion Act, No. 6 of 2004). 
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against government regulation of private land use activities that might 
impact investment activities.  This paper is also intended to inform readers 
of the emergence of regulatory takings claims in Kenya, lessons learnt from 
previous regulatory takings conferences, and the potential influence of 
United States regulatory takings jurisprudence on the determination of 
similar cases in Kenya.   
II. Background Information
In traditional societies, there were informal rules and regulations
governing acquisition, ownership, and use of land.  However, there was no 
formal system of land law in Kenya until 1899, four years after the British 
administration declared Kenya a British Protectorate.8  When the British 
colonial administration was extended to Kenya, application of the Indian 
Lands Acquisition Act of 1894 was applied to provide a basis for settler 
acquisition, ownership, and use of land.  The significance of that piece of 
legislation is that it marked the process of systematic introduction into 
Kenya of a common law system of land tenure, with all the attendant 
principles, doctrines, and concepts of ownership, use, and alienation.  The 
progressive establishment of a common law system of land ownership in 
Kenya saw the introduction of a number of laws in the form of ordinances, 
particularly, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, which conferred ownership 
of all land in the region now Kenya on her Majesty, the Queen of England, 
and introduced a system of land grants by her Majesty (through her 
assignsgovernors and commissioners in Kenya) to individuals and 
companies in the form of leaseholds for a term of years and freeholds 
(ownership in fee simple).9 
The progressive introduction of an English system of land law in Kenya 
did not occur in isolationit was complemented by a number of English 
administrative laws, including the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act of 1939.10  The act established official limitations to land 
ownership and use rights, largely through the exercise of (i) the 
governmental power of eminent domain and (ii) police powers.11  The 
8. The process of establishment of a formal system of land law in Kenya
commenced with adoption of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and subsequently, 
passage of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902.  
9. Crown Lands Ordinance (1902) (Kenya).
10. Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (1939) (Kenya).
11. The power of Eminent Domain is the power of the state or its assigns to
acquire private property for public purposes, subject to the prompt payment of 
compensation.  Whenever the state exercises this power, it forces involuntary 
transfers of property from private owners to itself or its assigns.  The power of 
eminent domain is derived from the feudal notion that as the sovereign, the state 
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exercise of both powers were retained after independence, as reflected in the 
country’s former and current constitution and a number of statutes 
governing land and related matters including the Land Acquisition Act (now 
repealed),12 the Agriculture Act,13 and more recently, the Environmental 
Management and Co-ordination Act of 199914 and the Land Act of 2012.15 
III. Recognition of Physical Taking in Kenya
Through the exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain,
the law of physical takings of private property has been recognized and 
officially legitimized in Kenya since colonial days.16  Eminent domain is the 
power of the State or its assigns to acquire private property for public 
purposes, subject to the prompt payment of compensation.17  In Kanini Farm 
Ltd. v. Comm’r of Lands (Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1981), for example, the court 
asserted that in case of derogation of the right to property through 
compulsory acquisition, prompt and just compensation must be paid.18  
Whenever the State exercises this power, it forces involuntary transfers of 
property from private owners to itself or its assigns.  The power of eminent 
domain is derived from the feudal notion that as the sovereign, the state 
holds the radical title to all land within its territory.  In Kenya, this power 
was embodied in the former constitution, which mandated that private 
property could only be acquired compulsorily for public use.19  Further, the 
constitution required that such public use must be weighed against the 
holds the radical title to all land within its territory.  Police power is the power of the 
state to regulate land use in the public interest in order to secure proper  resource 
utilization and management.  Exercise of the power is also an attribute of the 
sovereignty of a state. 
12. The Land Acquisition Act (1894) (India), whose application was extended
to Kenya in 1899.  
13. The Agric. Act, (1980) (Kenya).
14. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, No. 8 (1999) (Kenya).
15. The Land Act, No. 6 (2012) (Kenya).
16. See expressions of the power in section 75 of the former national
constitution, which authorized compulsory acquisition of private property, for public 
purposes.  The power of compulsory acquisition of private property was 
subsequently expressed in article 40(3) of the current national Constitution and in 
sections 107 to 127 of the Land Act, No. 6 (2012). 
17. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3) (2010) (Kenya), and Land Act, No. 6 (2012) §§ 107-127. 
18. Kanini Farm Ltd. v. Comm’r of Lands (1981) 1 K.L.R. 120, 120-26 (E&L)
(H.C.K) (Kenya). 
19. CONSTITUTION, § 75 (1987) (Kenya).
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hardship that may be caused to the landowner.20  Finally, the constitution 
required that the acquisition be accompanied by prompt payment of 
adequate compensation.21  The former constitution also provided for a 
modified form of acquisition in the case of trust land (referred to as “setting 
apart”), which may be activated by the President or local authorities.22  The 
rules governing the setting apart of trust land and the payment of 
compensation to affected residents are contained in the Trust Land Act.23  
The substantive law and basic tenets of compulsory land acquisition 
were incorporated in the new Constitution of Kenya that was approved by 
national referendum in 2010.24  The right to own land is enshrined in article 
40, which guarantees “every person” the right to own property of any 
description in Kenya.25  It prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property,26 but 
permits compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes upon payment 
of prompt and adequate compensation.27  The new Land Act of 2012, in 
sections 108 through 121, reiterates the principle that land shall be 
compulsorily acquired for public purposes only upon payment of prompt 
and adequate compensation.28  For the first time, section 121 uses the term 
“taking” with reference to physical taking of land compulsorily acquired.29  
One of the concepts newly introduced with regard to physical taking of land 
is a grant of alternative land (in lieu of payment of compensation)30 and 
payment of additional compensation, where it emerges that the value of 
land compulsorily acquired was much higher.31 
Courts in Kenya have had occasion to address various claims as a 
result of compulsory acquisition, arising mainly from failure to pay 
compensation at all,32 delay in payment of compensation,33 payment of 
20. CONSTITUTION, § 75(b) (1987) (Kenya).
21. CONSTITUTION, § 75 (c) (1987) (Kenya).
22. CONSTITUTION, §117 (1987) (Kenya).
23. Trust Land Act, (2009) Chapter 288 (Kenya).
24. CONSTITUTION, art. 3 (2010) (Kenya).
25. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(1) (2010) (Kenya).
26. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(2) (2010) (Kenya).
27. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3)(b)(i) (2010) (Kenya).
28. The Land Act, (2012) §§ 108 and 121 (Kenya).
29. The Land Act, (2012) §121 (Kenya).
30. The Land Act, (2012) §117 (Kenya).
31. The Land Act, (2012) §120 (Kenya).
32. See, for example, Shayona Timber Ltd. v. Kenya Nat’l Highway Auth. (2012)
H.C.K (Nakuru), Civil Suit No. 149 (Kenya).  Kenya National Highway Authority
purportedly acquired land reference number 9950/8 (original No. L.R. No. 9950/1/3,
East of Nakuru Municipality) for road expansion without compensation.
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inadequate compensation,34 and payment of compensation where 
landowners are removed from acquired land before finding alternative 
settlement sites.35 However, the law on physical taking of property by 
government and its agencies for public purposes has been in Kenya for a 
long time and is, generally, deemed to be acceptable; save for issues that 
arise concerning procedure, which are now governed by additional 
provisions in the new Land Act of 2012. 
IV. The Exercise of Police Powers and Emergence of
Regulatory Takings Claims
In addition to explicit authorization of physical taking of private
property for public purposes, a number of laws in Kenya governing various 
matters concerning land permit the government to limit or restrict private 
use of land, without physically taking away land, for a variety of purposes 
and reasons.  Such justifications include the need for proper land use 
planning,36 prevention of environmental harm,37 and insurance of 
sustainable utilization of land and related resources.38  The exercise of police 
power is also an attribute of the sovereignty of the state.  In relation to 
restriction of property use, the exercise of this power was expressed in 
section 70(c) of the former constitution.  That section specified that the 
rights set out in sections 70(a) and (b) of the same constitution with regard 
to property rights, including land-related rights, were guaranteed subject to 
such limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and 
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of 
others or the public interest.39  In the current constitution, the power is 
expressed more explicitly with reference to government control of land use 
activities as follows: “The State may regulate the use of any land, or any 
33. Id.
34. The issue was considered, among others, in Nzioka & 2 Others v. Tiomin
Kenya Ltd., (2001) 97 K.L.R. 427 (Mombasa High Court) (Kenya), 
35. Id. Local inhabitants complained that the Respondent mining company
promised to relocate them to alternative place before taking over the land but 
reneged on the promise. 
36. Need for proper land use planning is specifically expressed in article 66(1)
of the Constitution (2010).  It is also reflected in article 60 of the same Constitution 
and in the Preamble to the Physical Planning Act (1986) (Kenya), among other 
provisions of law. 
37. CONSTITUTION, art. 42 and 69(1)(g) (2010) (Kenya), and The Envtl. Mgmt. and
Co-ordination Act (1999) §§ 42-56, §§ 58-62, §§108-116, §142 (inter alia). 
38. CONSTITUTION, art. 60(1) and 66(1).
39. CONSTITUTION, §70(c) (1969) (Kenya).
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
451 
interest in or right over any land, in the interest of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality, public health or land use planning.”40 
An analysis of the laws indicates that so wide are some of the 
government’s land use control powers that their exercise could, in effect, 
render one’s private land less economically beneficial, or simply make it 
impossible for one to utilize his land at all.  An overview of such provisions 
follows: 
A. Imposition of Land Preservation Measures
Existing provisions in older legislation with far-reaching control effects 
that could make it impossible for one to utilize land at all, or prohibit the 
only economically viable use of land include provisions of sections 48(1)(a) 
through (e) of the Agriculture Act.41  The Act authorizes the minister 
responsible for matters concerning agriculture to require landowners to 
implement land preservation measures.42  In enforcing such preservation 
measures, the minister could issue orders prohibiting or controlling clearing 
or breaking land for cultivation, prohibit grazing or watering livestock on a 
particular parcel, and prohibit or control burning or destruction of 
vegetation.43  The minister can also issue land preservation orders requiring 
landowners, instead of cultivating desired crops, to undertake afforestation 
and reafforestation on their land and destroy or uproot any vegetation 
planted on their land in contravention of land preservation orders without 
compensation.44  Orders may also be issued to prohibit the use of one’s land 
for agricultural purposes altogether.45  Failure to comply with the orders 
attracts undesirable penalties.46  It is noted that government orders 
requiring the specified actions would have the effect of making it impossible 
for landowners to fully undertake desired beneficial activities on their land 
or to use their land at all, and could amount to regulatory takings.  However, 
it is also noted that the foregoing provisions of the Agriculture Act are rarely 
implemented. 
40. CONSTITUTION, art. 66(1) (2010) (Kenya).
41. The Agric. Act, (1980) § 48 (1)(a)-(e) (Kenya).
42. The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318,§43 (Kenya).
43. The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48 (1)(a)-(e) (Kenya).
44. The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48 (1)(b) & (c)-62 (Kenya).
45. The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48(1)(b)-(e) (Kenya).
46. The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §60 (Kenya).
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B. Declaration of Environmentally Significant Areas
Provisions in more recent legislation include section 54 of the 
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA), which 
empowers the responsible minister to declare areas of land to be 
environmentally-significant areas for purposes of protection.47  On the basis 
of statutory authority, the minister may declare “any” area of land to be an 
environmentally significant area for purposes of promoting and preserving 
specific ecological processes, natural environmental systems, natural 
beauty, species of indigenous wildlife, or the preservation of biodiversity in 
general.48  Thereupon, the National Environment Management Authority 
(NEMA) would prescribe measures for management and protection of an 
area so declared.49 However, there is no provision for payment of 
compensation to an owner whose land is declared environmentally 
significant.50  Nor does such a declaration constitute compulsory acquisition 
for which provisions for compensation would apply. 
Although no area of land in Kenya has been so declared, there are 
many qualifying areas in the country, including cheetah breeding grounds, 
swamps, water catchment areas, and private lands that serve as habitat for 
wildlife.  Both individual conservationists and conservation organizations 
have been urging the responsible ministers to issue declaratory orders to 
preserve deserving ecologically-significant areas as authorized by law.51 
Under the circumstances, it may be just a matter of time before an area is so 
declared, giving rise to claims for compensation resulting from regulatory 
action.  It is noted that provisions for declaration of environmentally 
significant areas affirm, in most minds, the government’s prioritization of 
environmental conservation measures that, together with other regulatory 
provisions of law, encourage citizens and other concerned parties to take 
enforcement actions including preparation of environmental impact 
assessments (EIA). 
C. Imposition of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Requirements
So far, enforcement of EIA provisions of EMCA has generated the 
clearest indication of landowner preparedness to present to the government 
a regulatory takings claim.  EIA requirements in sections 58-64 of EMCA and 
47. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §54(1) (Kenya).
48. Id.
49. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §54(2) (Kenya).
50. Id.
51. The statutory provisions authorizing declaration of environmentally
significant areas on “any land” do not provide for compensation of landowners. 
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the EIA and Audit Regulations (issued by Legal Notice No. 191 of 2003) 
present the most commonly used government mechanism for restricting 
private land use, with far-reaching consequences.52  The basic idea behind 
an EIA is that the government should predetermine the impacts that a 
development might have on the surrounding environment, and on that 
basis, make a prior determination to prohibit it, allow it conditionally, or 
allow it unconditionally.53  The Second Schedule to EMCA lists the kinds of 
activities requiring an EIA.54  Additionally, any activity that is out of character 
with its surroundings requires an EIA.55 
EIA and audit regulations specify the procedure to be followed by 
developers, also known as project proponents, in conducting EIAs prior to 
approval and license of a development.  The process involves preparation of 
a project report describing the nature of the development to be undertaken, 
the proposed location, materials to be used, the environment of the locality 
(baseline information on the environment of the locality), likely negative 
impacts, and a plan for mitigating negative environmental impacts.56  If the 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), to which a developer 
submits a project report, determines from the report that a development is 
likely to have significant impacts on the environment or that a developer’s 
proposed mitigation measures will not adequately address likely negative 
impacts, NEMA shall require a developer to undertake a full EIA study, to be 
conducted on behalf of a developer by an EIA expert.57  At the end of the 
whole process, including public participation, NEMA may decide to reject 
the project (meaning that it cannot be undertaken at all), approve the 
project with conditions intended to safeguard the environment, or approve 
the development unconditionally.58 
Through the EIA process briefly discussed, the government has, 
through NEMA, restricted private land uses of many kinds in the interest of 
environmental conservation, including conservation of biological diversity. 
For example, the government has, through NEMA (hereinafter, the 
Authority), restricted a private landowner to developing a maximum of four 
52. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §58-64 (Kenya).
53. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §63 (Kenya).
54. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) (Kenya).
55. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) (Kenya), Second Schedule,
Projects to Undergo Environmental Impact Assessment. 
56. EIA and Audit Regulations, Regulations 7(g) and (h) of the EIA and Audit
Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya). 
57. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §59 (Kenya), and Regulation
7(3) of the EIA and Audit Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya). 
58. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §60 (Kenya) and §§ 10 & 23
of the EIA and Audit Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya). 
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floors, down from the eight floors that the landowner was in the process of 
building, to house twenty one units on its private land known as Plot No. 
209/4902 in Riverside Gardens on Riverside Drive in Nairobi.59  The 
government has also, through the Authority, restricted a landowner’s 
development by requiring it to observe a six-meter riparian reserve of River 
Kirichwa Kubwa, which, in effect, forced the landowner to demolish a stone 
wall he had erected around his property.60  Additionally, the government has 
stopped a private landowner from converting the use of his land in a 
residential neighborhood to a commercial center on the basis that such use 
would negatively impact the aesthetic character of the surrounding 
environment and cause noise pollution and vehicular traffic without a 
showing by the developer of sufficient mitigation.61 
V. Emergence of Takings Claims
The foregoing cases, among others in which private land use was
partially restricted, did not generate any kind of claim for compensation, 
though property owners did assert their property use rights.  However, when 
the government, through the National Environment Tribunal, stopped a 
developer from constructing two luxury villas at the coast, it prohibited an 
investor from undertaking the desired development at all, and a claim of a 
regulatory takings nature emerged.62 The appeal was filed by an 
environmental conservation organization against the Authority’s approval 
and license of the establishment by an Italian developer of seven luxury 
villas on the basis that the process of approval was flawed, the 
developer/investor had encroached onto a public beach access, the land 
subsequently transferred to the developer had been illegally acquired, and 
that stakeholders were not properly involved in the Authority’s process of 
approval of the development.63  
In reply to the appeal, the investor raised the constitutionally 
guaranteed property right to utilize the land, which it stated was being 
infringed by parties seeking to stop the development.64  Before the Tribunal 
concluded hearing the appeal, the investor filed a judicial review application 
59. Phenom Ltd. v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. & Riverside Gardens Residents’
Ass’n (2005) 1, 4 N.E.T. 6 (Kenya).
60. A.T. Kaminchia v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. & M/S Bell Ways Garden Ltd.,
(2005) 1-13 N.E.T. 5 (Kenya). 
61. New Muthaiga Residents’ Ass’n v. The Director General, Nat’l Env’t Mgmt.
Auth. & Gemini Properties Ltd,, (2007) 24 N.E.T. 27. 
62. Malindi Green Town Movement & Another v. NEMA, Silversand Camping
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in the High Court, claiming that by challenging its right to own and develop 
the property in question, both the Tribunal and the appellants had infringed 
its rights to own and use property.65  The investor emphasized that the rights 
were derived from section 75 of the former constitution, which had elaborate 
provisions for protection of the right, now to some extent incorporated in 
Article 40 of the current constitution.  The investor sought orders of 
prohibition to stop the Tribunal from continuing to infringe the right by 
stopping it from proceeding with hearing.  The High Court granted the order 
of prohibition on the ground that the appellants did not have locus standi to 
prefer the appeal, in the process directing the investor to present its 
property rights claims to the Constitutional Court.66  The Tribunal appealed 
the decision, based on legal expansion of locus standi, especially under 
section 3 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, EMCA 
of 1999 (it is noted that the new national constitution has further expanded 
locus standi on environment and human rights matters).67  The Tribunal’s 
appeal is still pending in the High Court.68  
One of the points of concern for the Tribunal in Malindi Green Town 
Movement was that an aggrieved party, a developer, had responded to the 
application of regulatory restrictions with a property rights claim, based on 
constitutional provisions.  Would that be the end of such claims? 
Unfortunately, in judicial review, the High Court could not address the 
property rights matter, nor will it be addressed on appeal because the 
Tribunal only appealed the issue of locus standi.  It soon emerged that similar 
claims would begin to appear as investors sought to avoid regulatory 
limitation of their land use activities.69  
A year later, through an appeal, the Tribunal stopped a leaseholder 
from constructing a tourist lodge and camp in a cheetah breeding ground in 
an area slightly outside Maasai Mara Game Reserve in an effort to preserve 
the cheetah breeding ground.70  In that case, the landowner, who had leased 
land to a foreign investor, asserted his absolute land ownership rights and 
65. Republic v. NET, NEMA, Malindi Green Town Movement & Malindi South
Residents Ass’n. (2006) H.C.K , Misc, Application No. 391. 
66. Id.
67. CONSTITUTION, art. 70(1) & (3) (2010), echoing § 3 of the Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-
ordination Act (1999) (Kenya). 
68. Republic v. NET, NEMA and Malindi Green Town Movement & Malindi
South Residents Ass’n, supra note 67. 
69. See, Mutaka Ole Mpoya v. Maasai Mara North Conservancy Ltd. & Kenya
Tourism Fed’n (Nakuru Constitutional Reference No. 66 of 2010 /JR 34/2010) in which 
a similar claim has been raised in Malindi Green Town Movement. 
70. Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth.,
Wasafiri Camp Ltd. & Ben Kipeno & Others (2006) 07 N.E.T. 
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raised the issue of compensation of a regulatory takings nature.71  Ben 
Kipeno owns freehold land about two miles from the boundary of Maasai 
Mara Game Reserve, which he argued, he could not utilize for subsistence 
and commercial farming because of the presence of wildlife in the area.72  In 
order to generate money from the land, his only source of income, he invited 
a foreign investor to lease the land, at a fee, to establish tourist facilities 
thereon.73  The investor prepared an EA project report and submitted it as 
part of his application to the Authority for an EIA license.74  The investor’s 
application was granted and the development approved at a project report 
stagethe fact that the land in question was a breeding ground having been 
overlooked, concealed, or ignored.  After the investor commenced 
construction work, the Narok County Council, the local authority in whose 
jurisdiction the development in question was being undertaken, and the 
Kenya Tourism Federation, a conglomerate of a number of private agencies 
with various tourism related activities, appealed the Authority’s decision to 
approve and license the development at the project report stage.75  The 
County Council and the Tourism Federation contended that the EIA study 
process that informed the Authority’s decision to approve the development 
was flawed, having significant issues such as the fact that the area in 
question was a cheetah breeding ground was overlooked (and yet cheetahs 
are an endangered species in Kenya), and that key stakeholders were not 
involved in the development’s approval process.76 
The landowner’s takings claims were raised in evidence during hearing 
of the appeal.  The landowner claimed, inter alia, that he could not undertake 
any other activity on the land than team with an investor to establish a 
tourist facility because of the presence of wildlife in the area.77  He stated 
that for subsistence, he could have been farming, but could not do so due to 
the wildlife.78  He asserted that he had a constitutional right to use his 
property to earn a living and that stopping him from utilizing his land for the 
only commercially viable purpose was equivalent to taking his land away 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The information was presented as part of Ben Kipeno’s evidence in Narok
Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n, supra note 71. 
74. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n,
supra note 71. 
75. Kenya Tourism Fed’n v. NEMA & Ol Keju Ronkai Limited (2008) N.E.T 30.
76. Id.
77. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism
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from him.79  He argued that if the government stopped him from utilizing the 
land, it would have to pay him compensation for prohibiting him from 
making use of the land.80  The landowner and his witnesses stated that if 
they were stopped from using the land without compensation, they would 
make it impossible for wildlife to exist on the land.81  The Tribunal ordered 
that a full EIA study be conducted for the project, and in the meantime 
stopped the development.82   
For the fist time, the Tribunal was presented with a takings claim of 
this kind, which prompted members to seek more information on land use 
related claims where they could find it, and hence their attendance of the 
Regulatory Takings Conference for the first time.  One of the lessons learned 
was that the legal system in the United States recognizes land holder claims 
based on government restrictions and regulations that substantially 
diminish commercial viability of land, and that there are established legal 
parameters within which such claims may be honored.83 
Further property rights claims were raised in response to appeals filed 
against private developments in the following cases: 
Kenya Tourism Federation v. NEMA & Ol Keju Ronkai Limited (NET/30/08): In 
a developer’s response to an appeal against the establishment of a tourist 
facility on the outskirts of Maasai Mara on the basis that the attempt to 
restrict the development infringed property ownership rights.  The Tribunal’s 
ruling on a preliminary objection, allowing the appeal to proceed, was 
appealed to the High Court and is still pending.84 
Maasai Mara North Conservancy v. NEMA & Wasafiri Camp Limited 
(NET/40/2009) and the related Constitutional Petition No. 68 of 2010- Kerio 
Ole Naimodu v. Maasai Mara North Conservancy Ltd. & Kenya Tourism Federation: In 
the appeal before the Tribunal in NET/40/2009, appellants challenged the 
Authority’s failure to enforce the Tribunal’s judgment in NET/06/2005 by 
preventing the developers from proceeding with establishment of a tourist 
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n,
supra note 78.
82. Id.
83. See, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 
(1987), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 314 (1987) and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida DEP, 130 S. Ct. 
2592 (2010) in which courts in the United States expressed willingness to recognize 
certain government actions and decisions as constituting compensable regulatory 
takings. 
84. Kenya Tourism Fed’n, supra note 78.
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facility on a cheetah breeding ground.  By the time of filing the appeal, land 
initially meant for the development had been merged with others, including 
a lot belonging to Kerio Ole Naimodu, the petitioner in the Constitutional 
Court, and leased to an investor as a partner with the landowners in Leopard 
Gorge Conservancy, for the establishment of a tourist facility.   
Before the appeal was heard, Ole Naimodu, one of the land owners, 
filed a constitutional petition in the High Court in which he elaborately 
asserted his rights under sections 74-81 of the former constitution and 
sections 27 and 28 of the Registered Land Act (now repealed and replaced, 
in part, by the Land Act of 2012).  Naimodu’s petition argued that: (1) he had 
both constitutional and statutory rights of absolute ownership over his land; 
(2) the rights were constitutionally guaranteed and protected; (3) he had the
right to protection from deprivation of property without compensation; (4)
that he had a legal guarantee to utilize his land for subsistence and
commercial activities; (5) that he had the right under section 76 of the
constitution not to be held in slavery or servitude in relation to the use of
his property; (6) that he had the right not to accept entry by others into his
land except by his consent under section 76 of the constitution; (7) that
leopards that strayed on his property should be moved to Maasai Mara
Game Reserve in respect of his property rights; (8) that section 80 of the
constitution guaranteed him the right not to be hindered in the enjoyment
of his freedom to associate with others for protection of his property
interests; and (9) that on the basis of his Title Deed, he had the right to live
on the land and undertake any agricultural or other development activity
thereon.  He also claimed that by presenting an appeal to the Tribunal
against the grant to his lessee of development approval and license by the
Authority, the Appellants were depriving him of his property and
contravening his constitutional right to enjoy the property.  In addition, he
claimed that by stating that the Leopard Gorge area constituted by part of
his land was a cheetah breeding ground that should not be interfered with,
Appellants elevated the rights of animals above his constitutionally
protected property rights.85 
The claim by the petitioner that presenting an appeal to the Tribunal 
against the grant to his lessee of development approval and license by the 
Authority and his joint use of the land amounted to deprivation of his 
property is the aspect that comes close to claiming that application of EIA 
regulations deprive him of use of his property.  However, the petitioner did 
not ask the Constitutional Court for compensation.  He sought to stay 
proceedings in the Tribunal and obtain an order restraining appellants in 
the Tribunal appeal from filing further cases against his use of the property. 
85. Maasai Mara North Conservancy v. NEMA & Wasafiri Camp Ltd. (2009)
N.E.T. 40. 
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The Constitutional Petition has not yet been heard, but the Court has issued 
an order staying proceedings in the Tribunal.86 
Analysis of regulatory takings, like the claims in this paper, is limited 
to appeals, petitions, and judicial review applications that originated from 
the Tribunal.  It does not include an analysis of other claims that may have 
been presented to the High Court, outside of the Tribunal’s appeal 
processes.  Therefore, it may not be concluded that takings litigation is at 
the stage at which it has manifested in matters revolving around the 
Tribunal’s functions.  What does appear clear, from the claims described in 
the foregoing paragraphs, is that they manifest assertions of property rights 
that go beyond and seem to be intended by claimants to override the 
exercise of police powers of the state.  It also appears that as people 
become more enlightened, landowners are likely to advance their claims 
beyond the assertion of constitutional right to use property, to outright 
claims for compensation for land-based activities rendered impossible or 
limited by the application of official regulations, including EIA provisions, 
especially in light of the newly introduced provisions of the current 
constitution regarding property ownership and use. 
Although the constitution provides in Article 66(1) that the State may 
regulate the use of any land, or any interest in or right over any land, in the 
interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public 
health, or land use planning;87 some of its provisions seem to lend credence 
to claims for compensation in cases of “regulatory taking.”  Provisions of 
concern include: (1) Article 40(2)(a), which provides that “Parliament shall 
not enact a law that permits the State or any person: (a) to arbitrarily 
deprive a person of property of any description or of any interest in, or right 
over, any property of any description; (b) to limit, or in any way restrict the 
enjoyment of any right under this Article on the basis of any of the grounds 
specified or contemplated in Article 27(4);”88 and (2) Article 40(3), which 
specifies that:  
The State shall not deprive a person of any property of any 
description, or of any interest in, or right over, property of any 
description, unless the deprivation: (a) results from an 
acquisition of land or an interest in land or a conversion of an 
interest in land, or title to land, in accordance with Chapter Five 
(which includes Article 66(1) aforementioned, but negates 
86. Id.
87. CONSTITUTION, art. 66(1) (2010) (Kenya).
88. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(2)(a) (2010) (Kenya). “Any interest in any property of
any description” above could be understood to extend to development interests that 
one could now argue to be beyond government’s limitation, unless it is deemed that 
there is an internal conflict between the above provisions and article 66(1). 
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regulation for specified purposes unless land is first acquired); or 
(b) is for a public purpose or in the public interest and is carried
out in accordance with this Constitution and any Act of
Parliament that  (i) requires prompt payment, in full, of just
compensation to the person; and (ii) allows any person who has
an interest in, or right over, that property a right of access to a
court of law.89
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
Claims already presented are indicative of the likelihood of
presentation of more specific claims for compensation arising from 
application of government regulations, especially environmental regulations 
in the Tribunal and in the recently established Land and Environment Court. 
If arguments such as those described above are advanced a little further and 
with some knowledge of the relevant body of persuasive jurisprudence in 
other common law countries, the government could be faced with a number 
of costly regulatory takings claims.  Therefore, further training on the 
applicability of government regulations as they relate to property ownership 
and use is necessary.  A clarification of the full import of the constitutional 
provisions, especially articles 40(2) and (3) is also necessary.  It is expected 
that actual and would-be investors would benefit from knowledge that there 
are government restrictions that might impact their investment activities, 
positively or negatively. 
89. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3) (2010) (Kenya).
